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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RUSSELL E. RICHARDS, 
Defendant a;nd .Ap,pellant. 
Case No. 8279 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of April 17, 1954, at approximately 
9 :00 p.m., Mr. and Mrs. Pierre Giraud were visiting Mr. 
and Mrs. DeMar Hansen. Mrs. Giraud went outside the 
house and heard the sheep milling around in her hus-
band's corral nearby. She told her hushand and Mr. 
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Hansen that s·omeone or som·ething was in the corral and 
suggested that they investigate. Mr. Hansen and Mr. 
Giraud did so. Upon examining the corral, they found 
the sheep to be at one end of th~e corral bunched together 
as though th.ey were frightened. As they p-roceeded 
through the corral, they noticed that at the far end of the 
corral, separated from the other she·ep, was one sheep 
lying on the ground. The two men walked to the other 
end of the corral and at that point Mr. Giraud saw the 
defendant lying prostrate on the ground ·and holding 
the sheep by one of the hind legs (R. 24). The ·defendant 
then rel~eased the leg of the she.ep and the sh:eep got up 
and ran to the other sheep in the corral (R. 25). There 
were drag marks some 20 to 23 feet in length, ending 
at the place where the shHep lay, and ·extending in an 
"L" shape toward the center of the corral (R. 16). Mr. 
Hansen, Mr. Giraud and police officers, Bob Williams 
and Ross G. Fran·dsen, all testified that they examined 
these ·drag marks in the corral (R. 14, 23, 39, 48, 50, 53, 
54, 58). 
The defendant was charge'd with attempt to commit 
grand larceny. The jury, after hearing the evidence, 
~brought in a verdict ·of guilty. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPO·RT A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY AND THE STATE PRESENTED 
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW INTENT OF APPELLANT 
TO COMMIT GRAND LARCENY. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE· WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPO·RT A 
VERDICT OF GUILTY AND THE STATE PRESENTED 
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW INTENT OF APPELLANT 
TO COMMIT GRAND LARCENY. 
Se-ction 76-1-20, U.C.A. 1953, pr•ovides: 
''In every crime or public offense there must 
exist a union or joint operation of act and intent, 
or criminal negligence. '' 
Intent is an essential element of a crime or public 
offense in the State of Utah. State v. Monson, 210 N.W. 
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108, 109, 168 Minn. 381, defines intent as follows : 
"Intent in larceny means doing an unlawful 
act intentionally, that is freely, purposely." 
Section 76-1-21, U.C.A. 1953, informs as to th-e method 
by which intent may be determined: 
"The intent or intention is manifested by the 
circumstances connected with the offense and the 
sound mind and discretion of the accused. * * • '' 
The implication i~s that intent is to be determined by 
the acts of the ·defendant and other circumstances in-
volved in the evidence. State v. DuBois, 64 Utah 433, 231 
P. 625, holds that the elem~ent of intent must be estab-
lished by the circumstances of the taking or other proof. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in Loper v. 
U.S., 160 F-ed. 2d 293 (1947), held: 
"The second contention is that the evidence 
is insufficient to justify the verdict. Appellant 
contends that he in good faith believed that the 
calves were his own and that there was- no intent 
to steal them and that th·ere was no intent to steal 
them shown by the evid~nce. It is true that under 
the law of Utah (U.C.A. 103-36-1) intent is a 
necessary element of the crime of larceny, and 
felonious intent to steal the calves was: a fact 
which was necessary to establish by the evidence, 
since we must look to the law of the place where 
the property was taken in order to determine 
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5 
whether it was 'stolen' within the meaning of the 
act. · 
There was ample evidence to sustain the ver-
. diet. Intent is not always disclosed 'by what one 
says, but is determined by what one says and does 
or fails to say and do in a given situation, together 
with other facts and circumstances surrounding 
the transaction.'' 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insuffici-
ent to support the verdict ·on the gr·ounds that the State 
had not sufficiently proven the intent of the appellant. 
The jury, after hearing the evidence, wer~e instructed 
by the Honorable John L. Sevy, Judge of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, County of Carbon, as follows: 
''INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
"You are instructed that before you can find 
the defendant guilty as charged in the Informa-
tion, you must find from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt the following: 
* * * 
''4. That the defendant Russell E. Richards 
at said time and place att~empted the commission 
of said larceny with the intent to permanently de-
prive the said Pierre Giraud of the ownership of 
said sh~eep. 
''It is not enough that one or more of these 
elements be proved to your satisfaction beyond a 
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6 
reasonable doubt, but all of said elements must be 
prcved from the evidenee in the cas·e. '' 
(R. 10) 
. 
Thus the jury was charged that unless they found that 
I 
the attempt included the intent to steal, they were to find 
the def·endant not guilty. 
Instruction Nn. 10, made to the jury, states as follows: 
''In every crime or public offens·e, there must 
exist a union or joint ope-ration of act and intent. 
The intent or intention is manifested by the cir-
cumstances conniected with the offense, and the 
sound mind and discretion of the accused. 
''Every sane man is presumed to intend the 
natural and prohaJble consequences of an act which 
he intentionally performs. In other words, every 
person is presumed to intend t:Q.at which his acts 
indicate his intentions to have been." 
( (R.15) 
The cases support respondent's eontention that intent 
is to be determined by the acts of the accus·ed as well 
as by the words of the accused. See Lop,er v. U.S., supra. 
A ·California case where there was a charge against 
the def.endant of assault with intent to eommit rape, and 
the evidence showed that the defendant had enticed a 
twelve year old girl into a room and proceeded in addi-
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7 
tional disguisting manner 'but decided not to actually 
commit the crime of rape, and where the defendant 
plead that the evidence failed to show that defendant 
made the assault with the intent to eommit rape, ibut 
that his intention was to gratify an unnatural desire, 
which was not a crime, the court stated: 
'' * * * As he did not hav-e sexual intercourse 
with her, but did assult her, the question as to his 
intent was to be determined by all the circum-
stances and by the acts of defendant. * * * The 
intent of a person cannot be proven by direct 
and positive evidence. It is a question of fact to 
be proven, like any other fact, by acts, conduct, 
and circumstances. It was the p:eculiar province 
of the jury to find the intent. '' 
People vs. Johnson, 131 Cal. 511, 63 P. 842. 
It would he unreasonable to believe that the intent 
of defendant could be determined if the circumstances 
and acts ·of the defendant could not be us1ed in weighing 
the intent of the accused. Intent is within the private 
mind of the individual, except as expressed through his 
words and acts and the circumstances of the particular 
case. 
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The evidence provides the only means of determining 
intent, save .the actual truth when spoken by the accused. 
In the cas•e at hand, the jury determined the intent of 
the defendant to he consistent with the acts of the 
defendant, which, the jury concluded, was an attempt to 
steal the sheep. The conclusion of .the jury, under proper 
instructions by the eourt, was soun·d and the evidence 
is sufficient to support the verdict of guilty. Examples 
of the sufficiency of the evidence are referred to below: 
1. ·Commotion of ·sheep (R. 10, 22, 23). 
2. Defendant was found to have entered the corral 
·of another without permission (R. 11, 16, 24, 27, 37, 38, 
42, 51, 52). 
3. Th~e sheep was lying near defendant, and was 
removed from the other sheep (R. 13, 15, 31). 
4. Defendant had his hand around sheep's leg hold-
ing it ·down (R. 24, 27). 
5. The sheep was at the •end of several feet of drag 
marks (R. 14, 16, 20, 24). 
6. Drag marks clearly visible (R. 14, 23, 39, 48, 50, 
53, 54, 58). 
7. The sheep had been dragged near gate in corral 
(R. 33, 34). 
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9 
Fr-om thes~e circumstances and the balance :of the record, 
sufficient evidence was introduced upon which the jury 
could find the ·defendant guilty of attempt to commit 
grand larceny. The appellant argues that the evi~dence 
fails to show ~that defendant had any means of killing 
or :asporting the sheep from the premises of the owner. 
Appellant states that it is unreasonable to 1believe a man 
would 1be so negligent as to fail to arrange a means of 
asporting ,the object of h'is crime. 
This court is not required to discharge the appellant 
because there existed the pos'sihility that he might fail 
to complete a greater crime ,than that of which he has 
been found guil,ty. On the contrary, had he succeeded 
in asporting the sheep, the jury would have found him 
guilty of the greater crime of grand larceny. The court 
will not knowingly serve the criminal and the court 
will not relieve the appellant because he mi~scalculated 
in his planning to commi,t grand larceny. It is not the 
obligati~on uf the prosecution to prove .that the defendant 
could have succe~eded in committing grand larceny had 
he not been apprehended by the owner of the sheep. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
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The evidence was sufficient to ~support the verdict 
of the jury. 
Appellant s~tates that ''·a proper analysis of all testi-
mony will als-o f.ail to show any motive to injure or bene-
fit. Therefore, there is no crime committeed if the mind 
of the person is innocent." {Appellant's bri~ef p.18.) 
The absence ·of intent to injure has no importance 
in ·determining th~e intent to steal, as is clearly p~ointed 
ou,t in Skeen v. Cra.ig, 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487, 490: 
"The word 'intent' -as. use!d in Rev. Stat. 
1898, See. 4068, providing that 'in every crime 
or public offense there must exist a joint. opera-
tion of act and intent,' indicates an intent to -com-
mit and act or to do something which the l~aw 
denounces as a crime, regardless of the motives 
the accused may have had for doing the wrong. 
'The intent required is, not to break the law, but 
to do the wrong.' 
"If a man intends to do what he is conscious 
the law, which every one is conclusively presumed 
to know, foribids, there need he no other ·evil 
intent." 
The intent to benefit one's self is not a n·ecessary part 
of intent, :as is said in State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37, 189 P. 
84, wh·erein the court s~tates: 
''In ·order to constitute the crime of larceny, 
it is not necessary to prove that the accused 
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intended to derive s·ome benefit either to him-
self or for some other person from the theft.'' 
There ~seems to be no conflict in the testimony of the 
witnesses for the State. It will 1be noted that both Mr. 
Hansen and Mr. Giraud, witnesses for the State, tHsti-
fied that Mr. Hansen was looking out of the corral and 
into the field when Mr. Giraud found the defendant hold-
ing the sheep ( R. 11, 25). Mr. Giraud, however, did s·ee 
defendant holding the sheep (R. 24) and the question of 
fact raised iby denial of the defendant was a question for 
the jury. There was nro testimony ·or evi'dence presented 
to the court to indicate that the defendant was prejudiced 
by hatred against him by police officers Williams and 
Frandsen, except testimony of defendant. In State v. 
Peterson, 110 Utah 413, 174 P. 2d 843, 845, a ca:s·e involv-
ing the larceny of a heifer, the court, by Chief Justice 
Larson, states : 
'' * * * The mere taking of personal property 
by another does not, of eourse, constitute larceny. 
The taking must be with felonious intent. 
''As a general rule, the question of whether 
the taking is felonious is a question for the jury. 
See State v. DuBois.e, 64 Utah 433, 231 P. 625. An 
exception is where there is no legal warrant for 
the jury finding it to he felonious. State v. Mor-
~ell, 39 Utah 498, 118 P. 215; State v. Chynoweth, 
41 Utah 354, 126 P. 302; State v. DuBois, supra. 
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It is well settled by this c-ourt that when reason-
able minds may differ and arrive at opposite con-
clusions, the finding of the jury ·must control. 
State v. Gurr, 40 Utah 162, 120 P. 209, 39 L.R.A. 
N.S. 320." 
It is submitted that there was ·a ques.tion as to the 
intent of defendant upon which reasonable men could 
have ·differed. Un·der proper instruction'S by Judge Sevy, 
the jury considered the testimony of all witnesses for 
the State and for the defendant. Th·e jury performed 
their duty in accordance with the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the eourt below .should be affirmed. 
Resp~ectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
.Attorney General 
DONN E. CASSITY 
Assistant .Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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